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Federal Jurisdiction-Municipal Immunity Under the
Civil Rights Act-Closing the Loopholes
In Monroe v. Pape1 the United States Supreme Court held that
42 U.S.C. section 19832 does not contemplate municipal liability for
the unconstitutional acts of municipal employees. Since that de-
cision, however, the lower federal courts and several commentators
have developed a number of ways to distinguish Monroe and thus hold
municipalities vicariously liable. The Court, in two recent cases, closed
some of these "loopholes" in Monroe by reaffirming the controversial
interpretation of section 1983 that a municipality is not a "person"
within the meaning of that section. In Moor v. County of Alameda4
the Court refused to allow incorporation of municipal liability under
the California Tort Claims Act into a section 1983 claim and similarly
upheld the district court's refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
the state claim against the municipal defendant. In City of Kenosha
v. Bruno the Court held that equitable relief was unavailable against
a municipal corporation for violations of section 1983.
Moor involved injuries to appellants during a civil disturbance in
Berkeley, California. The injuries allegedly resulted from the wrong-
ful discharge of a shotgun by a deputy sheriff who was attempting to
quell the disturbance. Appellants brought suit in federal district court,
alleging a conspiracy to deprive them of their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech and assembly and due process. The federal claims
arose under section 1983, and jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U.S.C.
section 1343.0 Joined as defendants were the sheriff and several
deputies individually and the County of Alameda as their employer.
The latter was alleged to be amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. section
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch.
22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. 365 U.S. at 187-92.
4. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
5. 412U.S. 507 (1973).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). This is the general jurisdictional statute, giving
original jurisdiction to the federal district courts over civil rights claims.
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19887 which, the plaintiff contended, incorporated municipal liability
under the California Tort Claims Acts into section 1983. Both appel-
lants urged the district court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the
state law claims against the county.' The district court dismissed all
claims against the county, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.'0
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983
claim on the authority of Monroe v. Pape." The Court, in refusing to
accept appellants' argument that section 1988 incorporated municipal
liability into a federal section 1983 cause of action, pointed out that
section 1988 "is intended to complement the various acts which do
create federal causes of action for the violations of federal civil rights."' 2
The provisions of section 1988 authorizing use of state law are meant
to furnish suitable remedial measures when the federal substantive pro-
visions provide insufficient or unsuitable remedies. 8 The cause of ac-
tion must arise under the federal civil rights act' 4 initially in order for
section 1988 to be operative. An entire state cause of action cannot
be "federalized" through section 1988.15
Furthermore, the Court stated that section 1988 provides for the
use of state law by federal courts only when "not inconsistent with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States."'(' Since the Monroe
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall
be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States,
so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases
where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial
and disposition of the cause, and if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction
of punishment on the party found guilty.
8. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966).
9. Rundle v. Madigan, 331 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
10. Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), noted in 4 U. TOLEDO L.
Rav. 201 (1973). The court of appeals also dismissed Moor's diversity jurisdiction ar-
gument, holding that the county was not a citizen for diversity purposes.
11. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
12. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 (1973). The Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit on the diversity issue, holding that the county was a citizen of Cali-
fornia because, under state law it was a "body corporate and politic" and not the merd
arm or alter ego of the State. Id. at 717-22.
13. Id. at 702-03.
14. For purposes of this Note, the Civil Rights Act refers to those acts which are
now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-89 (1970).
15. 411 U.S. at 703-04.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
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decision was part of the laws of the United States, the imposition of
vicarious municipal liability would be inconsistent with the Monroe
interpretation of section 1983.11 The Court rejected the argument that
Monroe was distinguishable because the municipality involved in that
case had not been deprived of common-law sovereign immunity,
whereas in the present case California counties were no longer immune
under state law. Since Congress had rejected a municipal liability pro-
posal in passing the Civil Rights Act, it was difficult to infer an intent
to include liability for those municipalities not clothed with immunity
under state law.' The Court, therefore, held that the existence of
municipal liability under state law was irrelevant to liability under sec-
tion 1983.
The Court also affirmed the refusal by the district court to exer-
cise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim against the County.19
The question whether the district court had the power to exercise such
jurisdiction over a party not subject to independent federal jurisdiction
was left open by the Court. However, under the doctrine of United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs20 the district court had the discretion to decline
pendent jurisdiction. Since the claim against the county involved de-
fenses not available to the individual defendants and complicated is-
sues of state law, the Supreme Court held that the lower court's dis-
missal of the pendent state claims did not constitute an abuse of dis-
cretion. The Gibbs decision specifically recognized the possibilities of
jury confusion and the complexity of the state law as factors to be con-
sidered in exercising discretion.2
In City of Kenosha v. Bruno2 -the Court held that a municipal
corporation was not liable for the conduct of its employees for purposes
of equitable relief under section 1983. Appellants were owners of re-
tail liquor establishments that featured nude dancers. The city coun-
cils of Racine and Kenosha, Wisconsin denied renewal of their liquor
licenses after holding legislative hearings provided for by state statute.
Alleging deprivation of procedural due process, appellants brought
suits for declaratory and injunctive relief against the cities under sec-
tion 1983. The district court declared the state statute unconstitutional
and granted the injunctions. 23  On direct appeal the Supreme Court
17. 411 U.S. at 706.
18. Id. at 706-10.
19. Id. at 710-17.
20. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
21. Id. at 727.
22. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
23. Misurelli v. City of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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reversed because of lack of jurisdiction over the municipalities under
Monroe v. Pape.24 The Court reasoned that there was no evidence in
the legislative history of section 1983 that Congress meant to provide
a bifurcated approach to municipal liability, making municipalities
"persons" for purposes of equitable relief while excluding them from
liability for damages.2 5
MONROE v. PAPE
Monroe involved a section 1983 action for damages against the
City of Chicago for alleged brutality at the hands of Chicago police of-
ficers. The Court, after an extensive discussion of the legislative his-
tory of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,26 concluded that legislative re-
action had been so "antagonistic" to the concept of municipal liability
for civil rights violations that Congress could not have meant to in-
clude municipalities within the word "person" as used in section 1983.
This conclusion was based upon the rejection of a proposed amend-
ment to the Act during congressional debates.1
7
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Monroe, noted
that a few months prior to legislative consideration of the Civil Rights
Act, Congress had passed an act that had provided rules of construc-
tion for acts of Congress.28 One provision of this Act declared that
"the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate."29 He found this provision to be "an allowable, not a man-
datory, one." Since the Court interpreted the legislative history as con-
24. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
25. 412 U.S. at 513.
26. 365 U.S. at 187-91. Monroe has been severely criticized for its interpretation
of congressional intent on the municipal liability issue. See the convincing treatment
of the legislative history in Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 132-36 (1972). See generally
Kates, Suing Municipalities and Other Public Entities Under the Civil Rights Act, 4
CLEARINGHOUSE Rv. 177 (1970); Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the
Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. RE-V. 277 (1965); Note, Federal lurisdiction-Govern-
mental Immunity and Pendent Jurisdiction, 4 U. TOLEDO L. Rnv. 201 (1973).
27. Senator Sherman of Ohio proposed the amendment to provide for municipal
liability for any civil rights violation occurring within the boundaries of the municipality
whether committed by public officials or private citizens. The Senate passed the bill,
but it was rejected by the House. The conference committee failed to agree on the
amendment, and it was finally deleted in order to save the act and get it through the
House.
The House also raised questions about whether the imposition of liability by Con-
gress on the subdivisions of the states would be constitutional. The Court, however,
did not reach these constitutional issues. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
28. Id.
29. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
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elusively precluding municipal liability,3" the policy considerations fav-
oring municipal liability were not reached.
Monroe was extended beyond its holding by several lower federal
courts. It has been applied by analogy to immunize city agencies from
liability.3 It was interpreted, moreover, as prohibiting use of respon-
deat superior, even when the employer is a non-municipal entity or
public official, on the theory that only those who are personally in-
volved in the deprivation of an individual's civil rights are "persons"
within section 1983.32 This expansion was not universal, however, and
a number of courts held non-municipal public entities liable under
section 1983.33
MONROE UNDER FinE-ThE LOOPHOLES DEVELOP
Equitable Relief
The Seventh Circuit was the first lower court to test the boundaries
of the Monroe holding. In Adams v. City of Park Ridge34 the court
distinguished Monroe as having involved a claim for damages only.
The court concluded that equitable relief against the city was permis-
sible under section 1983. The reasons for denying damages against
a municipality, in the court's view, were not persuasive when applied
to prospective equitable liability that would not substantially impair the
public treasury. The distinction would appear valid and reasonable
except for a footnote in Monroe that seems to preclude equitable relief
as well as damages.35 In this footnote the Monroe Court noted:
In a few cases in which equitable relief has been sought, a munici-
pality has been named, along with city officials, as defendant where
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were alleged . . . . The question
30. See text accompanying notes 66-67 infra.
31. E.g., Davis v. United States, 439 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam);
Sellers v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 432 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 981 (1971); United States ex rel. Gittelmacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d
84 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970); Sams v. Board of Parole, 352
F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
32. E.g., Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Potts v. Wright, 357 F.
Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Barrows v. Faulkner, 327 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Okla. 1971).
33. Scher v. Board of Educ., 424 F.2d 741 (3d Cir. 1970) (by implication); Local
858, Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970). This position
is supported by cases in which the Supreme Court held non-municipal public entities
vicariously liable. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962). See Verkuil, Immunity or Responsi-
bility for Unconstitutional Conduct: The Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State,
50 N.C.L. REV. 548, 677-79 (1972).
34. 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
35. See Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th
Cir. 1967).
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dealt with in our opinion was not raised in those cases, either by
the parties or by the Court. Since we hold that a municipal cor-
poration is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, no infer-
ence to the contrary can any longer be drawn from those cases.30
The Adams court did not discuss this footnote in holding that
equitable relief was available although the court cited the cases men-
tioned in the footnote as authority for its decision.37  The Fifth Circuit
in Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School District8 discussed the
footnote and decided that it did not preclude equitable relief against
a miunicipalitya 9 The grant of equitable relief, moreover, seems to be
bolstered by Supreme Court decisions that allowed such relief under
section 1983 without mention of Monroe.
In Turner v. City of Memphis" the Supreme Court ordered is-
suance of an injunction against a municipality and a restaurant operator
under section 1983. The Court did not discuss the implications of the
footnote in Monroe although the alleged racially discriminatory prac-
tices by the restaurant occurred on property leased from the city. If
the footnote was intended to preclude equitable relief against a munici-
pality under section 1983, the result in Turner is not easily explained.41
Incorporation of State Law Through Section 1988
Most of the courts that have considered the question whether a
state law providing for municipal liability could be incorporated through
36. 365 U.S. at 191 n.50. Two cases in which equitable relief was granted against
municipalities under section 1983 were mentioned in the footnote. Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157 (1943).
37. 293 F.2d at 587.
38. 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
39. We think the [Supreme Court in Monroe] was saying in the footnote that
the issue of damages against municipalities under respondeat superior was a
question not raised in the equitable relief cases cited and that no inference may
be drawn from those cases that a municipal corporation is a person within §
1983 for the purposes of a damage claim against it under respondeat superior.
We do not perceive that the court was expanding its holding by a footnote
dictum to eliminate municipalities as "persons" under § 1983 for the purposes
of equitable relief, a question not expressly considered in the cited equitable
relief cases.
Id. at 322. See also Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971);
Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Schnell v. City of Chicago,
407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Wolfe v. O'Neill, 336 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Alas. 1972).
40. 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam).
41. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Moor, cited Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225 (1970) as authority for his argument that equitable relief was not foreclosed by
Monroe. In Mitchum the Court held that section 1983 was a specific exemption to
a federal statute barring injunctions against state court proceedings. Section 1983 was,
therefore, properly the basis of a suit to restrain unconstitutional state court actions.
The decision, however, appears to be less than persuasive as support for municipal lia-
bility under section 1983.
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section 1988 into a section 1983 cause of action have rejected it.42
In Carter v. Carlson,43 however, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held the District liable for violations of section 1983 by Dis-
trict police. The court pointed out that Monroe had involved an Illi-
nois municipality that had not waived its common-law immunity. The
District of Columbia, on the other hand, had no such immunity and
"the scope of immunity under section 1983 should follow the local
rule. ' 44  Since the local rule provided -for more effective implementa-
tion of the Civil Rights Act than the federal statutes, the court reasoned
that section 1988 should be available to incorporate that rule into the
section 1983 action.
Several other courts have considered the Carter rationale and have
rejected it. Some have distinguished it on the basis of congressional
control of the District of Columbia and on the ability of Congress to
provide for section 1983 liability for the District.45 The Seventh Cir-
cuit seems to have stated the basic objection to Carter, however, in
Yumich v. Cotter.46  "With all respect, however, we read Monroe as
a binding statutory construction, not dependent upon state law im-
munity, and not related to a deficiency in federal remedies, but estab-
lishing that section 1983 does not impose liability for damages upon a
city.
'547
Section 1988 has been used to borrow remedial measures from
state law where the substantive sections of the Civil Rights Act were
inadequate to implement its policies. Most notable is Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park48 in which the Supreme Court incorporated the state law
of damages into a section 1982 claim. This type of incorporation ap-
pears to be the correct application of section 1988, i.e. where the cause
of action arises under the substantive provisions of the Civil Rights Act
and no adequate redress is available within the Act. Since municipal
liability cannot arise under section 1983 because of -the bar of Monroe,
a state law that waives municipal immunity cannot cure this jurisdic-
tional defect. 49
42. E.g., Gonzales v. Doe, 476 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1973).
43. 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). The Supreme Court did not reach the issue
of section 1988 incorporation; holding that the District of Columbia was not a "State
or Territory" within section 1983.
44. Id. at 369.
45. E.g., Ries v. Lynskey, 452 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1971).
46. 452 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 61.
48. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
49. While § 1988 may allow use of state remedies in redressing deprivations
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Pendent Jurisdiction
Where none of the foregoing methods of obtaining jurisdiction
over a municipal defendant are available, a federal court might still
retain jurisdiction over the state law claim under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Since providing a federal forum, to litigants who could
get no relief from the state courts, even where state law ostensibly pro-
vided such relief, was one of the primary objectives of Congress in en-
acting the Civil Rights Act,50 the avenue of pendent jurisdiction, if
open under the circumstances, is valuable in fulfilling this objective.
There is some dispute, however, over whether a federal court has the
power to join a party, not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction, in a fed-
eral action against different parties properly before the court.5 '
The Supreme Court established the accepted test for the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.5 2  The test
involves two issues: (1) does the court have the constitutional power
to hear the state claim, and (2) in the court's discretion, will the poli-
cies of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants"5'
be promoted by hearing both claims in one trial? The court has the
power to hear the state claim if:
[T]he relationship between the [federal] claim and the state claim
permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court com-
prises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim must have
under § 1983, at least where federal remedies are deficient, . . .we are here
confronted with the preliminary issue of whether liability exists at all under
§ 1983, not what remedy would be appropriate if liability should exist. Mani-
festly the nature of an appropriate remedy, which assumes the existence of lia-
bility, is irrelevant to the question of whether liability can attach in the first
place.
Gonzalez v. Doe, 476 F.2d 680, 685 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. See, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961); Kates & Kouba, supra note
26, at 145-46.
51. Compare Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969), and Wojtas v. Village
of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964), and Drennan v. City of Lake Forest, 356 F.
Supp. 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1972), with Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d
800 (2d Cir. 1971), and Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), and Eidschun
v. Pierce, 335 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Iowa 1971); cf. Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dun-
lap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971).
52. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). This decision changed the earlier test of Hum v.
Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). The Hum prerequisite for the exercise of pendent juris-
diction was that the federal and state claims be merely different grounds for the same
cause of action. If the federal claim constituted a different cause of action, there could
be no pendent jurisdiction; id. at 246. Gibbs called this approach "unnecessarily grudg-
ing", and therefore the Court liberalized the criteria for pendent jurisdiction. 383 U.S.
at 725. See Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 657
(1968); Note, 4 U. TOLEDO L. REV., supra note 26, at 216-28.
53. 383 U.S. at 726.
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substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court. The state and federal claims must derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to
their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he
would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial pro-
ceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there
is power in federal courts to hear the whole.54
If the court has the power under this test, it must then decide whether
to exercise its discretion to grant or deny pendent jurisdiction. "Its
justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to the litigants; if these are not present a federal court should
hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims. . .."55
The Gibbs decision did not consider the troublesome problem of
"pendent parties," i.e. where pendent jurisdiction is used to bring into
federal court a party not independently subject to a federal claim by
joining a state claim against him to federal claims against other par-
ties.'l8 The lower federal courts have divided on the question of the
power to hear such claims under the Gibbs test,5 7 and some have
avoided the issue by declining to grant pendent jurisdiction as a matter
of discretion."
The pendent party question in the context of section 1983 and
municipal liability was considered by a federal district court in Tauss
v. Rizzo." Plaintiffs attempted to enter Frank Rizzo's mayoralty
campaign headquarters to protest his policies as Police Commissioner
of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs were brutally beaten by police officers
guarding the headquarters and arrested on numerous charges. Sub-
sequently aquitted of all charges, plaintiffs brought action against Rizzo
and the assaulting policemen under section 1983. They joined the City
of Philadelphia in an amended complaint. The court held that the city
was not a "person" within section 1983. But the court then asserted
pendent jurisdiction over the municipality. The court pointed out that
54. Id. at 725.
55. Id. at 726.
56. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 26, at 161-67; Note, 4 U. TOLEDO L. REV.,
supra note 26, at 216-28. See also Note, 81 HAnv. L. REv., supra note 52.
57. Compare, e.g., Eidschun v. Pierce, 335 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Iowa 1971), with
Barrows v. Faulkner, 327 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Okla. 1971).
58. E.g., Gonzalez v. Doe, 476 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1973); Patrum v. City of Greens-
burg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
59. 361 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1973). This case was decided after the Supreme
Court handed down Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). See Smith v.
Spina, 477 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1973); cf. Salinas v. Flores, 359 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Tex.
1973); Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347 (D. Hawaii 1973); Schwab v. First Appalachian
Ins. Co., 58 F.R.D. 615 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
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"[t]he now *permissible claim against the City is based upon the simple
application of the principle of respondeat superior which would pre-
sent no difficulty to a fact finder. The factors of judicial economy and
the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits dictate that these claims should
be tried in a single lawsuit." 60
MOOR AND KENOSHA-WHAT WEIGHT TO GIVE MONROE?
The Court in Monroe regarded the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act as conclusively establishing the proposition that municipali-
ties were not to be held liable for violations by their employees. Since
Congress had not provided for such liability and the Court could not
expand the statute without congressional approval, it considered policy
factors irrelevant.6 ' In the Court's two recent decisions on the issue,
Monroe was reaffirmed without question, and policy was again dis-
missed as irrelevant to the inquiry.
62
The desirability of municipal liability under section 1983 cannot
be questioned. 63  The arguments are generally the same as those
against common-law sovereign immunity, and a justification for such
immunity is difficult to formulate. 64  However, given the Monroe de-
cision, these policies, indeed, become irrelevant to a subsequent court
proceeding, and the arguments for change must be made to Congress."
This does not mean the Court was necessarily justified in extending the
60. 361 F. Supp. at 1199.
61. It is said that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal liability
because private remedies against officers for illegal searches and seizures are
conspicuously ineffective, and because municipal liability will not only afford
plaintiffs responsible defendants but cause those defendants to eradicate abuses
that exist at the police level. We do not reach those policy considerations.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
62. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693 (1973).
63. "Governmental liability is important not only to provide financially responsible
defendants, but primarily so that the deterrent will be effective where it is needed-
at the level where police policy is made." Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations
of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493, 514 (1955). See also UNITED STATES
COMm'N ON CIVIL RiGHTs, 1961 COMM'N ON CIVrI RIGHTs REPORT: JUSTICE, Book V,
at 111, 113.
64. The usual justifications are presented in Kates v. Kouba, supra note 26, at 142-
44. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 449 (1961); Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong: A
Comparative Study of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New
York Court of Claims, 22 AD. L. REv. 39 (1969).
65. Since the Monroe holding has been reaffirmed and extended in Moor and Ken-
osha, the Court appears unwilling to change that interpretation of section 1983. Legis-
lative change was suggested soon after Monroe in UNITD STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 113.
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Monroe holding without considering the purposes behind enactment of
the Civil Rights Act.
The Civil Rights Act was enacted pursuant to the enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment for the purpose of providing a fed-
eral forum to persons deprived of their rights under the newly enacted
amendment. The federal courts were necessary to enforcement because
state courts were suspected of not enforcing the rights of Negroes and
of allowing civil rights violators to go unpunished either criminally or
civilly.66 The provisions for federal jurisdiction were not made de-
pendent upon the presence or absence of an adequate state law rem-
edy but were meant to provide a federal forum despite state laws.6 7
In Moor the Court assumed the correctness of the Monroe holding
that Congress had not made municipalities answerable in damages for
the acts of employees that violated section 1983. The Court then held
that section 1988 could not be used as a means of obtaining federal
jurisdiction over a municipality.6" This holding was the result, how-
ever, of the Court's reading of section 1988 and was not based merely
upon the force of Monroe.69 The construction given section 1988
seems consistent with its apparent purpose in the civil rights scheme
70
to provide suitable remedies for violations of the substantive provi-
sions of the Act. Of course, the Court's assumption was implicit that
municipalities could not violate these substantive provisions under Mon-
roe.71  The purpose of the Act in providing a federal forum should
66. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
67. "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief."
Id. at 183.
68. See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
69. The Court briefly reviewed the legislative history of secton 1983 in rejecting
the argument that where state law provided for vicarious municipal liability, section 1983
should not prohibit such liability. 411 U.S. at 707-10.
70. The Court looked to the legislative origins of section 1988 in order to discover
its intended scope. The Court concluded that:
Considered in context, this latter portion of § 3 [of the original 1866 Civil
Rights Act], which has become § 1988 and has been made applicable to the
Civil Rights Acts generally, was obviously intended to do nothing more than
to explain the source of law to be applied in actions brought to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Act including § 1 [now § 1982]. To hold other-
wise would tear § 1988 loose from its roots in § 3 of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act. This we will not do.
Id. at 705-06.
71. The petitioners did not attack Monroe but sought to circumvent it by arguing
that since a municipality could not be held liable under section 1983 as interpreted in
Monroe, the federal law was inadequate to redress civil rights violations against judg-
ment proof individual defendants. Therefore, petitioners contended, section 1988 makes
state law available to federal courts, and the County should be made liable under section
1983 as supplemented by the state law of vicarious liability for municipalities. Monroe
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not be implemented at the cost of a tortured interpretation of one of its
provisions. Since section 1988 was interpreted reasonably,"2 only by
overnuling Monroe could the Court have allowed federal jurisdiction,
and then only through section 1983 and not section 1988.
The decision in City of Kenosha v. Bruno,73 however, rested en-
tirely on Monroe. The latter contains strong support for the proposi-
tion that "the generic word 'person' in § 1983 was [not] intended to
have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on
the nature of relief sought against them. '7 4  However, that conclusion
is not compelled by the facts of Monroe, and the Court could have
distinguished Kenosha on that basis and promoted the purposes of the
Civil Rights Act without overruling Monroe.7 C
Since Monroe was based on Congress' rejection of the Sherman
Amendment, which provided for damages against a municipality, the
Court in Kenosha could easily have held that a bifurcated approach
allowing equitable relief was consistent with Monroe and its interpre-
tation of the legislative history. Such a holding would allow federal
courts to issue injunctions against municipalities and thereby correct
governed, therefore, only to the extent of defining the substantive limits of section 1983;
the Court in Moor conducted an independent investigation of the legislative history of
section 1988 and concluded that this section was intended to incorporate state law in
order to supply remedies. However, since a claim against the County could not arise
under section 1983, there could be no substantive liability on which to append a state
law remedy, and section 1988 was not intended to create substantive liability through
state law incorporation. But see Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 55 Mmi,. L. REv. 1201 (1971).
72. The Court distinguished cases in which state laws of vicarious liability were in-
corporated into section 1983 through section 1988 where the person held vicariously li-
able was an individual superior public official, who was subject to the substantive pro-
visions of section 1983, rather than a municipality that could not be substantively liable.
411 U.S. at 704 n.17.
At least one lower court has voiced concern over this distinction.
The court remains concerned about a possible anomoly in these Civil
Rights laws. [Monroe] could be evaded by joining the directors of a state
agency and not the agency itself if the relevant state law, applicable through
§ 1988, included vicarious liability for governmental employees. . . . In con-
trast, a state agency cannot be vicariously liable under the Civil Rights laws
regardless of possible state law of respondeat superior. [Moor]. Thus individ-
uals and not a state government, may have to bear the financial burden of
a civil rights judgment in a case in which they are not charged with having
committed any specific acts against the plaintiffs.
Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1275 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
73. 412 U.S. 507 (1973); see text accompanying note 22 supra.
74. 412 U.S. at 513.
75. The plaintiffs in Monroe sought only damages whereas in Kenosha plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Had the Court undertaken an independent in-
vestigation of the legislative history of section 1983, the Court could undoubtedly have
held that equitable relief would not be inconsistent with congressional disapproval of
damages. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 26, at 147-48.
MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
abuses by applying pressure on local policy making officials to deter
their employees from violations of the Civil Rights Act. 6 Moreover,
the holding that equitable relief is not available in Kenosha is difficult
to reconcile with decisions of the Court, subsequent to Monroe, that
allowed such relief in somewhat analogous circumstances.
77
If injunctions were issued against municipalities under section
1983, this alone would not completely overcome the general objections
to municipal immunity,78 but such relief would go far in supporting
the purposes of the Civil Rights Act.79 A federal forum would be
provided to protect federal civil rights against municipalities acting or
condoning action by their servants in disregard of those rights. Such
relief seems to be the essence of the Civil Rights Act. Yet Kenosha
blindly follows Monroe and, without discussing these policies, cuts off
the possibility of equitable relief.
CONCLUSION
Pendent jurisdiction appears to be the only "loophole" remaining
after Moor and Kenosha that provides a federal forum for actions un-
der section 1983 against municipalities. Although Moor upheld a
denial of pendent jurisdiction on discretionary grounds, it refused to
decide the question of the power of the federal courts to hear "pendent
party" claims.8 0 Until that question is resolved by the Supreme Court,
the lower courts are likely to continue reaching divergent results in
joining municipal defendants to federal section 1983 claims against in-
dividuals.
The logical approach for the Supreme Court to take on the ques-
tion would be to deny the power to join parties through the judicially
developed doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. However desirable this
76. See note 63 supra.
77. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
78. Even if injunctions could secure freedom from deprivation of constitu-
tional rights for the plaintiff, their non-compensatory nature renders them an
incomplete remedy. Not only are private attorneys less likely to take the case,
but the injured parties, knowing the costs of litigation and the lack of monetary
award, will often choose to endure the abuse. This reduces the likelihood of
reform and increases the boldness of the offending agency.
Kates & Kouba, supra note 26, at 151.
79. Some commentators have suggested that if equitable relief were available in
civil rights actions against municipalities, it would be possible to get a damage claim,
based on state law, into federal court through pendent jurisdiction. Kates, supra note
26, at 201.
80. 411 U.S. at 413-15. The Court noted the analogy of pendent parties to
"joinder of new parties under the well established doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in
the context of compulsory counterclaims under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 13(a) and 13(b)
and in the context of third-party claims under ... 14(a)." Id, at 414-15.
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method of joinder, it would be somewhat inconsistent, after the Court
has determined that Congress intended to deny a federal claim against
a party, then to grant federal jurisdiction by merely joining the party to
a closely connected claim against a party properly before the federal
court.81
Since the Court has refused to limit or overrule Monroe, it seems
logical to expect that it will not allow that decision to be circumvented
through pendent party jurisdiction. However, the Court could allow
such joinder of a municipality to a federal section 1983 claim on the
theory that such joinder does no violence to the Monroe holding since
the municipality would not be held liable under section 1983, a possi-
bility foreclosed by Moor and Kenosha, but only under applicable state
law. Pendent party jurisdiction would serve merely as a convenient
method of trying the state claim together with a federal claim arising
out of the same facts in a single proceeding in federal court.
Until the Court finally resolves the question, the availability of
pendent party jurisdiction will continue in some federal courts. The
doctrine satisfies the purposes of the Civil Rights Act by providing a
federal forum to hear claims against municipalities in section 1983 ac-
tions. However, pendent jurisdiction is not a panacea, for it depends
absolutely on the state law governing sovereign immunity and respond-
eat superior.82 Furthermore, the ease with which some courts deny
pendent jurisdiction in their discretion and the reluctance to find abuses
of that discretion tends to reduce the effectiveness of this method of
getting municipalities into federal court for section 1983 violations.
The holding of the Court in Monroe was virtually the death blow
to section 1983 actions against municipal corporations, and the loop-
holes that developed were destined to be short-lived in the absence of a
reconsideration of that decision.83 The closing of these loopholes in
Moor and Kenosha forces a difficult decision upon section 1983 liti-
gants; forego the federal forum and join the municipality in a state ac-
tion, or sue only individuals in federal court and, if pendent jurisdic-
tion is denied, forego the benefits of a municipal defendant.
WILLIAM R. SAGE
81. See Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
82. See Salinas v. Flores, 359 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
83. Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, dissented in both Moor and Keno-
sha arguing that the loopholes should remain open. He added to his opinion in Kenosha
an appendix that developed the legislative history of section 1983 beyond that considered
in Monroe, 412 U.S, 'at 517-20,
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